단행본CEPR Discussion Papers 12979
Financial incentives and earnings of disability insurance recipients: evidence from a notch design
- 청구기호
- DP 12979
- 발행사항
- London : CEPR, 2018
- 형태사항
- 59 p. :. PDF file ;. 898 KB
- 분류기호
- 듀이십진분류법->DP
소장정보
위치 | 등록번호 | 청구기호 / 출력 | 상태 | 반납예정일 |
---|---|---|---|---|
이용 가능 (1) | ||||
E0003095 | 대출가능 | - |
이용 가능 (1)
- 등록번호
- E0003095
- 상태/반납예정일
- 대출가능
- -
- 위치/청구기호(출력)
책 소개
Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability-a notch- and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of financial incentives on DI beneficiaries' earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the earnings threshold. However, the elasticity driving these responses is small. Our estimate suggests that relaxing the earnings threshold reduces fiscal cost only if program entry is very inelastic.