연구보고서IMF Working Paper 16-196
Is capping executive bonuses useful?
- 청구기호
- WP 16-196
- 발행사항
- Washington, D.C. : IMF, 2016
- 형태사항
- 37 p. :. PDF file ;. 726 KB
- 키워드
- Executive compensation, Risk taking, Risk shifting, Underinvestment, Employee compensation, Investment, Risk management, Labor markets, Labor mobility, Econometric models
- 바로가기
소장정보
위치 | 등록번호 | 청구기호 / 출력 | 상태 | 반납예정일 |
---|---|---|---|---|
이용 가능 (1) | ||||
E0002083 | 대출가능 | - |
이용 가능 (1)
- 등록번호
- E0002083
- 상태/반납예정일
- 대출가능
- -
- 위치/청구기호(출력)
책 소개
This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the impact of bonus caps on banks’ risk taking. In the model, labor market price adjustments can offset the direct effects of bonus caps. The calibrated model suggests that bonus caps are only effective when bank executives’ mobility is restricted. It also suggests, irrespective of the degree of labor market mobility, bonus caps simultaneously reduce risk shifting by bank executives (too much risk taking because of limited liability), but aggravate underinvestment (bank executives foregoing risky but productive projects). Hence, the welfare effects of bonus caps critically depend on initial conditions, including the relative importance of risk shifting versus underinvestment.